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Abstract: This article suggests that the shape of Conciliar Trinitarianism is 
rather different to what is often supposed in recent theological treatments 
of the Trinity. Conciliar Trinitarianism does support the claims of the 
consubstantiality of the Son and the full divinity of the Spirit, but is not 
directly concerned with a doctrine of One God in three persons in 
abstraction from the economy of salvation. The economy (οἰκονομία) is 
not taken as the starting point for knowledge of the “immanent Trinity”. 
Instead, claims about Trinity in itself ground claims about the economy of 
salvation.  
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1. Introduction: Pawl's Criteria and Conciliar Trinitarianism 
 
Timothy Pawl’s recent book on “Conciliar Christology” (Pawl 2016) aims at an 
exploration of the key teachings of the first seven ecumenical councils with 
regard to the “doctrine of the incarnation”. Conciliar Christology, he says, is “the 
conjunction of all the claims made at these councils concerning the doctrine of 
the incarnation.” (Pawl 2016, 1)  He clarifies the motivations leading to his choice 
of these seven ecumenical councils, rather than a larger or smaller set of 
magisterial statements, by pointing out that in this way he can speak of the faith 
of the great majority of Christians: “Thus, the largest conjunction of ecumenical, 
christological claims that traditionally receives special status in both the eastern 
and western traditions is the conjunction that comes from these seven councils.” 
(Pawl 2016, 1)  In executing this decision, however, he does not confine himself 
to any one genre of conciliar document, opting instead to consider all forms of 
documentation approved by these seven councils, including documents 
approved by though not composed by those councils. 
 
The conjuncts of this conjunction come from definitions and expositions of faith, 
creeds, canons, and anathemas of the councils. If such conciliar statements 




include other documents – for example, as Chalcedon’s Definition of the Faith 
accepts Cyril’s second letter to Nestorius and his letter to John of Antioch, as well 
as Leo’s Tome to Flavian (Tanner 1990, 85) – then I will include the Christological 
teachings from those documents as conjuncts of Conciliar Christology, too. (Pawl 
2016, 12) 
 
His generosity in this sense stretches, for example, to Cyril’s Third Letter to 
Nestorius, including its 12 Anathemas, because although this letter may not have 
been accepted by the Council of 431, it clearly was by the Council of 553 (Pawl 
2016, 12-13). 
 On the other hand, Pawl chooses not to take later Latin councils into 
consideration. To do so would, in his view, weaken the catholicity of the conciliar 
christology that he intends to consider. He wishes to take into consideration the 
“creeds, canons, expositions of faith, and anathemas, as well as any documents 
accepted and endorsed in the previously listed sources” (Pawl 2016, 3). He 
chooses not to appeal to scripture or the fathers in order to justify the truth of 
conciliar christology, since it is not his intention to prove the truth of the doctrine, 
but to examine the teachings of these councils, responding to logical and 
philosophical point of view to difficulties that the doctrine of the Incarnation 
raises (Pawl 2016, 4). On this basis. Pawl begins his enquiry by setting out, in his 
first chapter, the key teachings of conciliar christology. In his estimation, these 
teachings may be schematically set out as follows: 
 
(i) there was (and is) one person, Jesus Christ, the Second Person of the Holy 
Trinity, who, after the incarnation, has two complete and distinct natures. One of 
these natures is (ii) the one and only divine nature. The other nature is (iii) a fully 
human nature. These natures were (iv) combined in a unique mode of union, 
called the “hypostatic union.” In virtue of this union, (v) predications are true of 
Jesus Christ according to each nature. (Pawl 2016, 14) 
 
The current article will argue that if one applies Pawl’s criteria to a similarly 
conceived reconstruction of Conciliar Trinitarianism, the shape of trinitarian 
reflection emerging will be rather different to the trinitarianism that draws on 
later church teachings together with the teachings of the patristic and scholastic 
authorities of the classical tradition. We will see that the ecumenical councils1 do 
 
1 It is important to note that in this essay, I use the expression “ecumenical councils” to indicate 
the first 7 ecumenical councils, following Pawl’s usage. I set aside the thorny question of the 
ecumenical nature of later councils said to be “ecumenical”. I do not deny that these might also 
be defended as ecumenical. It might be safe, however, to suggest that the ecumenical character of 
 




not appear to directly support many of the claims that trinitarian theology takes 
for granted and argue that this is of direct interest to any attempt to discuss the 
contours of a Conciliar Trinitarianism. 
 The crucial question is: what is “trinitarianism”? This word might mean 
something quite general like “everything and anything to do with the doctrine 
that the God of Christianity is One God in three persons”. More specifically, it 
might mean adhesion to that doctrine such that “trinitarianism” might be 
contrasted with unitarianism, modalism or tritheism. In either case, the existence 
of a doctrine of the Trinity is presupposed. What is this doctrine, and is it found 
in the teaching of the ecumenical councils?  
These might seem to be idle questions; I will argue that they are not. Indeed, 
if we give what appears to be the obvious answer to the first question, we will 
find that we will have to answer the second question negatively. The apparently 
obvious answer to the first question is that the doctrine of the Trinity is the 
doctrine that there is One God in three persons, namely the Father, the Son and 
the Holy Spirit. Let us call this summary DT1. Yet, if we confine ourselves to 
Pawl’s criteria we find that this doctrine is not explicitly stated anywhere in 
Conciliar Trinitarianism. Instead, what we find in Conciliar Trinitarianism might 
be summarized as follows: there is One God, the Father, and that the Son and the 
Holy Spirit share in the divinity of the One God in a non-subordinationist way 
such that the Trinity of Father, Son and Holy Spirit are all rightly called God and 
together work in the economy of salvation, culminating in the Incarnation of the 
 
later councils is less than fully manifest when produced in a context of church division. Pawl’s 
motivation is to speak of the faith of the majority of Christians. A question I would raise is 
whether there might be some analogy between the relation of scripture to the doctrine of these 7 
ecumenical councils, and the relation of these 7 ecumenical councils to later ecumenical councils 
of the Latin tradition. Scripture does not make explicit every dimension of the Christian faith, and 
neither do the first 7 ecumenical councils. Nevertheless, scripture does have a kind of primacy 
such that the dogmas expressed in the first ecumenical councils are rooted in scripture. I see no 
reason why a distinction between the teaching of these ecumenical councils should be taken as 
ruling out the ecumenical quality of later councils. Nevertheless, the first 7 might be thought to 
have a kind of primacy with respect to the later councils. The question is not simply a question of 
ecclesiology. It is perhaps also a question of how the Holy Spirit has accompanied the church’s 
unfolding understanding of the Christian faith. The words of Dei Verbum 8 seem apposite here: 
“For there is a growth in the understanding of the realities and the words which have been 
handed down. This happens through the contemplation and study made by believers, who 
treasure these things in their hearts (see Luke, 2:19, 51) through a penetrating understanding of 
the spiritual realities which they experience, and through the preaching of those who have 
received through Episcopal succession the sure gift of truth. For as the centuries succeed one 
another, the Church constantly moves forward toward the fullness of divine truth until the words 
of God reach their complete fulfilment in her.” 




Son and the outpouring of the Holy Spirit. Let us call this summary DT2.  
 Within the confines of this short article I can do no more than present a 
preliminary argument for the claim that DT1 is not an accurate summary of 
Conciliar Trinitarianism, and the claim that DT2 is a more promising starting 
point. I will conclude with some comments on the ways in which DT2 relates 
claims about the economy of salvation to claims about the Trinity apart from the 
economy of salvation. 
 
2. DT1 and Conciliar Trinitarianism 
 
DT1 – the commonly assumed understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity 
– states that there is One God in three persons, the Father, the Son and the Holy 
Spirit. This extreme summary might be expanded to include other claims. A 
helpful overview of such claims is set out in the introduction to Chapter 3 of 
Neuner-Dupuis’ The Christian Faith in the Doctrinal Documents of the Catholic 
Church (2001). The editors of this book, obviously, do not attempt to work within 
the confines of Pawl’s criteria, and are therefore not mistaken in attributing many 
of the claims for the doctrine of the Trinity to official Catholic Church teaching. 
However, if one does assume Pawl’s criteria, one sees how many of the points of 
teaching that they include in their summary are not part of Conciliar 
Trinitarianism. I take Neuner-Dupuis’ list of doctrinal points on the Triune God 
as one example of what contemporary theology takes as the doctrine of the 
Trinity (DT1), and in my comments I seek to show how the claims of DT1 fall 
largely outside the scope of the teaching of the ecumenical councils. In the 
following section, I will attempt to indicate how DT2 is a better summary of the 
teaching of Conciliar Trinitarianism. 
 One should immediately note that the title of chapter 3 of this book, “The 
Triune God”, already shows that their summary will reach beyond the contents 
of Conciliar Trinitarianism, since strictly speaking God is not said to be Triune in 
the ecumenical councils. While the ecumenical councils do defend the full 
divinity of the Son and the Holy Spirit, such that each of them is rightly said to 
be God, it is not automatically true that the Trinity is also God. The editors of 
Neuner-Dupuis, in contrast, assume throughout their list of teaching points that 
the word God is to be understood as meaning the whole Trinity.  
 The first of the teaching points they list is as follows: “There is one personal 
God”. In support of this claim, they list The Symbol of the Roman Order of 
Baptism, The Symbol of Eusebius, The Symbol of Nicaea, The Symbol of Cyril of 
Jerusalem, The Symbol of Epiphanius, The Symbol of Constantinople, The Faith 
of Damasus. They also list texts from Lateran IV, the Creed of Paul VI, the Tome 




of Damasus2 and Dei Filius of the First Vatican Council. If we choose from this list 
the documents approved by the ecumenical councils, namely the Symbols of 
Nicaea (325) and Constantinople (381), we do of course find that there is one God, 
who is clearly personal. But it is not stated in these Symbols that the “one God” 
in question in the Trinity. In these texts it is directly stated that the One God is 
the Father, Almighty. 
 Since there is no other text of the ecumenical councils that states that the One 
God is the Trinity, we must take the teaching that the One God is the Father as a 
key point of Conciliar Trinitarianism. Neuner-Dupuis, however, not bound by 
Pawl’s criteria, assume that the word God simply means the Trinity in the 
teaching point – “In God there are three persons, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit”. 
The documents listed in favour of this second point are ND 1–19 (all of the 
symbols and professions of faith, including those of Nicaea and Constantinople 
I), and then – once again – Lateran IV, Paul VI, then the Letter of Dionysius to 
Dionysius of Alexandria (262), the Tome of Damasus (382), the Council of Toledo 
(675), and the Decree for the Copts of the Council of Florence (1442). Again, if we 
look only to the documents considered as sources of Conciliar Trinitarianism, we 
do not find any statement that there are three persons in God. Instead, we find 
that there is One God, the Father, the Son of God who is “true God from true 
God” and consubstantial with the Father, and the Holy Spirit who proceeds from 
the Father, and is rightly worshipped with the Father and the Son. In their listing 
of magisterial sources, they give the impression that the Christian faith, from the 
earliest times, manifests a stable doctrine in an idea of God who is one, but who 
is also three persons. Attention to strictly defined Conciliar Trinitarianism, 
instead, reveals a development in the use of God language, with the idea of One 
God in three persons appearing only in later magisterial texts. 
 The assumption that the One God simply is the Trinity is, of course, far from 
uncommon. Indeed, since many assume that the doctrine of the Trinity is the 
doctrine of One God in three persons, any claim otherwise might appear to be 
incompatible with the doctrine of the Trinity. We should not be alarmed, 
however. The ecumenical councils certainly do proclaim the Trinity. To proclaim 
the Trinity, however, is not the same as stating that the One God is the Trinity. In 
its simple form, found in the Symbols of Nicaea and Constantinople, it is the 
proclamation of belief in God (the Father), in the Son of God and in the Holy 
Spirit, each of who is fully divine. Conciliar Trinitarianism is also against any 
modalist reduction of the three to one, such that to proclaim the Trinity is to 
 
2 The reader is left to wonder at meaning of the chronologically curious sequence: Paul VI, 
Tome of Damasus, Vatican I. 




proclaim the eternal distinction of the three. This is stated, for example, in the 
rejection of what was taken as the implicit modalism in the theology of Marcellus 
of Ancyra, and formulated in the expression of the Symbol of Constantinople 
(381): “His kingdom will have no end”. The proclamation of God, the Son of God 
and the Holy Spirit, and the denial of modalism, however, does not mean that 
the One God is the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and the ecumenical councils 
nowhere use the term “One God” to refer to the Trinity.  
 The Conciliar teaching of the Trinity, however, is more than simply the 
teaching that there is One God (the Father) and there is the Son of God and the 
Holy Spirit. It is also the claim that each of them is properly said to be divine, and 
that neither the Son nor the Spirit should be said to be one of the creatures. Thus, 
it can be said that all three of them are “God”; though each in a different sense. 
The Father is the One God, the Son is the Son of God, consubstantial with the 
Father, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the One God. The Symbol of Nicaea 
uses the language of consubstantiality as its primary way of expressing the true 
divinity of the Son. The Council of Constantinople (381), faced with 
subordinationist tendencies with regard to the Holy Spirit, does not use this same 
language to speak of the true divinity of the Holy Spirit, but rather of fact that 
the Holy Spirit is “worshipped and glorified with the Father and the Son”. In 
context, this is to be taken as a clear statement of the non-subordination of the 
Spirit, since no creature should be worshipped alongside the Father and the Son. 
Clearly, the fact that the expression “One God” is reserved to the Father is not to 
be taken in such a way that the Son and the Holy Spirit are among the creatures. 
 Returning to Neuner-Dupuis’ list of teaching points: the editors then offer us 
a number of points that are grouped under the heading “One God, three 
persons”. We have just seen that the first three points were listed under the 
heading “The Christian concept of God”, and the most relevant of these for our 
purposes was that there is “one personal God”. It now appears that this one 
personal God is the Trinity, and – presumably – is “personal” because it is 
composed (so to speak) of three “persons”. There are several points listed under 
the heading “One God, three persons”. These are that “in God there are three 
persons, Father, Son and Holy Spirit”; that the “three are one undivided 
Godhead”; that “each person is fully God” with three sub-points – that the Father 
is fully God, that the Son is fully God and that the Holy Spirit is fully God – ; that 
the “divine persons are distinct from one another”; and, finally, that they “are 
distinct through mutual relationship.” 
 A number of comments are called for here. The first relates to the doctrinal 
point that “in God there are three persons”. Among the texts quoted in support 
of this idea we find the symbols of Nicaea and Constantinople, so at first sight it 
appears that we have direct and complete support here for DT1. If we accept this 
point and combine it with the heading “One God, three persons”, one quickly 




arrives at popular summary of the doctrine of the Trinity itself: “one God in three 
persons”. Unfortunately, however, for a Conciliar Trinitarianism that follows 
Pawl’s criteria, we do not find this teaching in either Nicaea or Constantinople, 
at least not with the neat formula that the summary suggests.  
 Problems arise with all parts of the formula, not just with the expression “One 
God”, which – as we have seen – refers to the Father and not to the whole Trinity, 
but also with the expression “three persons”, as well as with the somewhat vague 
“in” that the popular formula uses to link “One God” with “three persons”. With 
regard to the use of the term “person”, it is worthy of note that it is not used in 
either of the Symbols of the Faith. Indeed, if we examine the texts that Neuner-
Dupuis quote in support of this doctrinal point, we see that the Letter of 
Dionysius of Rome to Dionysius of Alexandria (262) uses the term hypostasis only 
in order to characterize a position to be excluded as compromising the monarchia: 
“they somehow preach three gods as they divide the sacred unity into three 
different beings (hupostaseis), entirely separate from each other” (ND 301). To 
state this is simply to point out that whatever the use of that letter means, this 
text, which in any case would not be considered a source for Conciliar 
Trinitarianism, cannot be used to support the language of three persons. More 
relevant is the citation of the Tome of Damasus (382), which embraces the term 
persona more than a century later: “Anyone who denies that there are three true 
persons, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, equal, living eternally, 
containing all things visible and invisible, all powerful, judging, creating and 
saving all things, is a heretic” (ND 306/21). Unfortunately, the latter text would 
not be invoked in a Conciliar Trinitarianism that follows Pawl’s criteria.  
 Entirely missing, instead, from Neuner-Dupuis’ list of authorities in favour of 
the idea of there being three persons is the primary conciliar text that uses the 
language of persons to indicate the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, namely 
the first canon from the Second Council of Constantinople (553). This text reads, 
in the translation found in Neuner-Dupuis: 
 
If anyone does not confess that Father, Son and Holy Spirit, are one nature (phusis) 
or essence (ousia), one might and power, a Trinity one in being (homoousios), one 
Godhead to be worshipped in three hypostases or persons (prosopon), anathema 
sit. For one is the God and Father from whom all things are, one is the Lord Jesus 
Christ through whom all things are and one the Holy Spirit in whom all things 
are. (ND 620/1) 
 
Here is a conciliar text, acceptable on Pawl’s criteria, that uses the language of 
three hypostases. This text, however, is not quoted by Neuner-Dupuis in favour of 
their doctrinal point that there is one God in three persons. As far as I can tell, if 
by “trinitarian” we mean a focus on the doctrine of the Trinity in se, this is the 
most “trinitarian” of conciliar texts. Notwithstanding this, this canon of the 




Council of 553 is found in Neuner-Dupuis, not in the chapter on the Triune God, 
but in the sixth chapter, on Jesus Christ the Saviour.  
 This text, however, does not contradict what has been said above about the 
One God being the Father. On the crucial point, the Greek text does not speak of 
“one God” (ἒνα θεὸν) as in first line of the symbols of Nicaea and 
Constantinople, but only of “μίαν θεότητα”, which can  be translated “one 
divinity” or “one Deity” or divinity rather than one God. Indeed, the canon goes 
on to quote 1 Cor 8:6 where Paul is quite clear that the one God is the Father. 
 It is worth comparing this canon of 553 with a text of the Lateran Council (649) 
which, though similar in many ways, uses the expression “one God” in a new 
way, which then becomes standard in the Latin tradition, to indicate the whole 
Trinity: 
 
If anyone does not, according to the holy Fathers, confess truly and properly the 
Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, Trinity in unity and unity in Trinity, that 
is, one God in three consubstantial hypostases equal in glory; and for the three 
one and the same Godhead, nature, essence (ousia), power, Lordship, kingship, 
authority, will, action (energeia) and sovereignty; uncreated, without beginning, 
infinite, immutable, creator of all beings and holding them together in his 
providence, let him be condemned. (ND 627/1) 
 
It is here, rather than in the texts of the ecumenical councils themselves,3 that we 
find the language of one God in three hypostases. One searches in vain even in the 
most significant Western contribution to the ecumenical councils, the Tome of 
Leo, for any identification of the One God with the Trinity.  
In the introduction to Chapter 3 of Neuner-Dupuis, the editors give voice to 
the concern that presumably lies behind their failure to highlight the fact that the 
use of the language of One God is not the language of the ecumenical councils. 
They write: 
 
In the patristic theology of the East the idea prevailed that the one God is God 
the Father, and that the Son and the Spirit share with him his divine life. This 
conception had the merit of being based on Scripture, but it could lend itself to 
misinterpretations. It could lead to subordinationist ideas which, in fact, did 
spring up in the East and came to a climax with the heresy of Arius. The other 
conception, prominent in the West, conceived God as the one divine substance, 
comprising Father, Son and Spirit. In this view, the unity of God and the 
equality of Father, Son and Spirit were easily safeguarded; but, the basic truth 
 
3 See Cubitt (2014) for reflection on the ecumenical quality of this synod. 




of the oneness of the divine nature could be misunderstood in such a way as to 
lead to the denial of the real distinction between the three persons. Modalism 
in its various forms did, in fact, deny this distinction. (Neuner and Dupuis 2001, 
135–136). 
 
Despite the obvious attempt at balance in this statement, the claim appears to be 
made that speaking of the “one God” as the Father, rather than as the Trinity, can 
lead to “subordinationist ideas.” They also correctly make the point, however, 
that this identification of the one God with the Father has the merit of being based 
on Scripture. That being the case, it is not something that can be easily set aside, 
whatever the perceived risk of subordinationism.  
 Whatever the scriptural merit of the position here associated with the Eastern 
tradition, it is certain that a strict interpretation of Conciliar Trinitarianism would 
be bound to this tradition. It is true that the first 7 ecumenical councils emerged 
in the Eastern context, but they are recognized as ecumenical, rather than Eastern, 
councils. If it is true that there was a certain tendency to subordinationism in the 
patristic theology of the East, it is nevertheless also true that such 
subordinationism is explicitly overcome in the first and second ecumenical 
councils without any move away from the identification of the One God with the 
Father. Evidently, the opening line of the Symbols, where it is specifically stated 
that “one God, the Father almighty, maker of heaven and earth, of all things 
visible and invisible” is not subordinationist. The conclusion must be that the 
Symbols of the Faith proclaim both a belief in One God and in the Trinity of 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Since the anti-subordinationism of these councils 
cannot be doubted, we must conclude for Conciliar Trinitarianism, the claim that 
the One God is the Trinity is not necessary in order to avoid subordinationism. 
This cannot be simply ignored in Conciliar Trinitarianism. 
 I can deal more quickly with the remaining points in Neuner-Dupuis’ 
summary. The next doctrinal point that the editors list is that the “three are one 
undivided Godhead”. Obviously they have many texts to quote here, especially 
from the Western tradition: the Quicumque, Lateran IV, Lyons II, the Creed of 
Paul VI, Letter of Dionysius (262), Tome of Damasus (382), the Council of Toledo 
(675), the Council of Florence (Decree to the Copts, 1442), the first canon of 
Constantinople II (553), and the Lateran Synod (649). Of these, the most relevant 
to a Conciliar Trinitarianism is, once again, the first canon of Constantinople II, 
which speaks of “one nature or essence and one power and authority of Father 
and Son and Holy Spirit, a consubstantial Trinity, one Godhead worshipped in 
three hypostases or persons” (ND 620/1). This claim can therefore be taken as 
part of Conciliar Trinitarianism. 
 The next doctrinal point is that “Each person is fully God”. Here there is no 
need to comment on the texts involved, since the intention of the Symbols of 




Nicaea and Constantinople adequately establish this point, though they do not 
do so with precisely the words “fully God”, preferring to find other ways to 
indicate that the Son and the Spirit are “consubstantial” with the Father, although 
this expression was adopted with some difficulty, and that the Spirit is Lord or 
“lordly” and is rightly co-worshipped and co-glorified with the Father and the 
Son. One curious point is that in their treatment of the subpoint that the Father is 
“fully God” the source Neuner-Dupuis offers is from the Eleventh Council of 
Toledo (675). One would have thought that this point is simply assumed, since 
the One God is said to be the Father in the Symbols, rooted – as we have seen – 
in scriptural texts such as 1 Cor 8:6. Although this council would not be 
considered in a Conciliar Trinitarianism, I will quote this text because it helps 
reinforce a previous point: 
 
We confess and believe that the holy and ineffable Trinity, Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit, is one God [unum Deum] by nature, of one substance, of one nature as 
also of one majesty and power. 
And we profess that the Father is not begotten, not created, but unbegotten. For 
he himself, from whom the Son has received his birth and the Holy Spirit his 
procession, has his origin from no one. He is therefore the source and origin of 
the whole Godhead. He himself of his own essence is the Father, who in an 
ineffable way has begotten the Son from his ineffable substance. Yet he did not 
beget something different (aliud) from what he himself is: God has begotten 
God, light has begotten light. From him, therefore, is “all fatherhood in heaven 
and on earth” [cf. Eph 3:15 VulgJ.] (ND 308) 
 
What is interesting here is the contrast with what we have already seen in 
Conciliar Trinitarianism as expressed by the Symbols of Nicaea and 
Constantinople. Toledo specifically states that the Trinity of Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit is one God by nature, of one substance etc. This is not in direct contradiction 
with the teaching that the one God is the Father, since Toledo is not saying that 
the “one God” is the Trinity, but rather that the Trinity is one God. Nevertheless, 
the point worth noting is that the Trinity here comes before the Father, such that 
the Father is treated as one of the persons of the Trinity, rather than as God 
himself. It is probably for this reason that the Neuner-Dupuis cite this text4 rather 
 
4 In their introductory comment on this council, the editors acknowledge that it was not a 
particularly important council. Here is what they write about the council: “small local Council, 
attended by only 17 bishops, has little significance today except for the beautiful confession of 
faith which was recited at its opening. The official value of this document consists in the fact that 
in subsequent centuries it was very highly regarded and considered a genuine expression of the 
 




than the Symbols of Nicaea and Constantinople on the full divinity of the Father.  
Neuner-Dupuis next list two points that clearly are part of Conciliar 
Trinitarianism: that the Son is fully God and that the Holy Spirit is fully God. 
With the next teaching point, things are not so clear. This point is that the “divine 
persons are distinct from one another”. On this point, no text approved by an 
ecumenical council is cited, even though the real distinction of the Father, Son 
and Holy Spirit is clearly presupposed by the councils. The same is true of the 
following point, namely that the three are distinct through mutual relationship. 
Here, the editors quote Toledo, Florence and Paul VI, but no ecumenical council 
can be cited. This claim, therefore, will not form part of Conciliar Trinitarianism, 
however much it is part of the shared traditions of East and West. Strictly 
speaking, Pawl’s criteria would exclude points such as these, even though they 
are present in the theological discourse of the time of the ecumenical councils.  
 It is perhaps revealing that the point that the three of the Trinity are distinct 
through mutual relationship is listed prior to a collection of teachings that the 
editors list on the origins of the divine persons. The first subpoint here is that the 
Father is “absolute origin, from himself”. It is not clear to me why no ecumenical 
council is cited here, since it would have been possible to claim that the idea that 
the Father is the absolute origin, from himself, is implicit in the teaching of all 
ecumenical councils, and indeed almost explicit in the teaching that the Father is 
the One God, who generates the Son and from whom the Holy Spirit proceeds. 
Perhaps the problem is similar to the one we encountered above on the fact that 
the Father is “fully God”.  
 On the origin of the Son, instead, the editors summarize the point as follows: 
“The Son is born from the Father, from eternity”. Here among the texts that they 
can quote from the ecumenical councils, they can clearly quote the Symbols of 
Nicaea and Constantinople. Looking at the issues surrounding those councils, 
the issue would seem to be especially related to the eternal generation of the Son, 
since that issue was particularly to the fore in the 4th century debates. Here we 
are on extremely solid ground, as far as Conciliar Trinitarianism is concerned, 
and a great number of other conciliar texts could have been cited on this point.  
 Neuner-Dupuis then state that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and 
the Son. Here, of course, the editors of Neuner-Dupuis, not having any 
ecumenical council to cite, fail to include any reference to the First Council of 
 
Trinitarian faith; it is one of the important formulas of doctrine. In fact, hardly anywhere is the 
reflection of the early Church on the Trinitarian mystery and on Christ expressed with such 
precision and acumen as in this Creed which sums up the tradition of the earlier Councils and 
patristic theology of the West” (Neuner and Dupuis, 2001, 142–143). 




Constantinople’s teaching that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father. 
Obviously, they do quote texts like the Quicumque, the Council of Toledo, the 
medieval councils of Lateran IV, Lyons and Florence, the Creed of Paul VI in 
support of the double procession, but nothing from the canon of Conciliar 
Trinitarianism following Pawl’s criteria. The most interesting text that they list 
here, as far as Conciliar Trinitarianism is concerned, is the Vatican Clarification 
(i.e. the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity’s document 
“Clarification on the Greek and Latin Traditions Regarding the Procession of the 
Holy Spirit”, 1995). Even though they do not quote the teaching of 
Constantinople to the effect that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, they 
do quote the indication of the Vatican Clarification that the Western teaching that 
the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son is not in contradiction with the 
teaching of Constantinople:  
 
The Father alone is the principle without principle of the two other persons of 
the Trinity, the sole source (pege) of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. The Holy 
Spirit therefore takes his origin from the Father alone […] in a principal, proper 
and immediate manner [….] The doctrine of the Filioque must be understood 
and presented by the Catholic Church in such a way that it cannot appear to 
contradict the Monarchy of the Father nor the fact that he is the sole origin 
(arche, aitia) of the ekporeusis of the Spirit. (ND 339) 
 
The choice to not quote the Council of 381, but to quote the Vatican Clarification 
on the compatibility of the Western doctrine with that council, may be an 
oversight, but it appears to be a tendentious oversight, and in any case not 
relevant to Conciliar Trinitarianism as defined, which simply states that the Spirit 
proceeds from the Father. 
On the point that the Holy Spirit is uncreated Love-Gift no ecumenical council 
is cited. Similarly, on the teaching that the divine persons are united through 
mutual indwelling no ecumenical council is cited. Having dealt with the origins 
of the divine persons, the editors of Neuner-Dupuis move to a number of points 
for which no ecumenical council can be cited. The first is that the divine actions 
in the world are common to the three persons.  
The second subpoint is most important for the argument that I will present in 
the conclusion to this article. It is that the “The Trinitarian mystery is revealed in 
the mission of Son and Spirit for the salvation of human beings”. The reference 
here is to a summary that the editors offer of the Second Vatican Council, with 
special reference to Lumen Gentium 2–4 and Ad Gentes 2–4. This is curious, since 
the texts quoted do not actually make the point that the missions of Son and Spirit 
reveal the Trinitarian mystery, and especially not the mystery of the Trinity in 
itself. The only reference to “revelation” is in Lumen Gentium 3, where there is 
reference to Christ revealing the mystery of the kingdom.  




The final point that the editors list in their summary of the church’s teaching 
is a reference to the idea that these missions can be understood as God’s self-
communication. The reference here is to John Paul II’s encyclical Dominum et 
Vivificantem (1986). 
 
In his intimate life, “God is love” (1 Jn 4:8.16), the essential love shared by the 
three divine persons: personal love is the Holy Spirit of the Father and of the 
Son. Therefore he “searches even the depths of God” (1 Cor 2:10), as uncreated 
Love-Gift. It can be said that in the Holy Spirit the intimate life of the Triune 
God becomes totally gift, an exchange of mutual love between the divine 
persons, and that through the Holy Spirit God exists in the mode of gift. It is the 
Holy Spirit who is the personal expression of this self-giving, of this being-love. 
He is Person-Love. He is Person-Gift. Here we have an inexhaustible treasure 
of the reality and an inexpressible deepening of the concept of person in God, 
which only divine revelation makes known to us. (ND 337/10) 
 
These final references to documents of the Second Vatican Council and to 
Dominum et Vivificantem make important reference to the idea of revelation, and 
specify a particular way of conceiving the relationship between the economy of 
salvation and the trinitarian mystery. There is a kind of passage from the 
economy of salvation to the trinitarian mystery, though this idea is not supported 
in the texts cited from Vatican II.5 The quotation from John Paul II manifests 
something of the same structure, with its development of the “intimate life” of 
God, which is the “essential love shared by the three divine persons”, the “depths 
of God”. In this quotation we also have the idea that “divine revelation” reveals 
the “concept of person in God.” In these final references, a major structure of 
recent trinitarian thought, so obvious to many as to be taken as fundamental, 
emerges. This structure is that the “economic Trinity” reveals the “immanent 
Trinity”, with the implication that the latter represents the privileged focus of 
trinitarian thought. When one penetrates from the economic to the immanent 
Trinity, according to this view, one reaches the proper place of inexhaustible 
treasure: the Trinity in itself. 
 
5 It is unclear why there is no reference to Dei Verbum. N. 2 states that “In His goodness and 
wisdom God chose to reveal Himself and to make known to us the hidden purpose of His will 
(see Eph. 1:9) by which through Christ, the Word made flesh, man might in the Holy Spirit have 
access to the Father and come to share in the divine nature (see Eph. 2:18; 2 Peter 1:4)”. In the 
statement that God chose to reveal not just the hidden purpose of His will, but also Himself, one 
might find better support if one understands by “Himself” the Trinity. In the New Testament 
passages quoted, however, it is better I think to assume that it is God (the Father) who is intended, 
and is revealed through the missions of the Son and the Spirit. 




In brief, there is partial support for DT1 in Conciliar Trinitarianism. There is 
One God, and there is the Trinity of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, without the 
subordination of the Son and Spirit to the Father. Strictly speaking, Conciliar 
Trinitarianism does not support the idea that there is One God in three persons, 
nor any support for accounts of the inner life of the Trinity revealed by the 
economy of salvation. The reader of the documents of Conciliar Trinitarianism 
will not find the structure of the economic Trinity revealing the immanent 
Trinity, nor indeed the doctrine of the Trinity as One God in three persons. I do 
not mean, of course, that such developments are invalid or mistaken. I mean 
merely that one should be careful not to impose such later developments onto 
the reading of Conciliar Trinitarianism. Instead, what we find is something more 
closely resembling what I am calling DT2.  
 
3. DT2 and Conciliar Trinitarianism 
 
Let me begin by quickly recalling the outline formulation of DT2 that I offered in 
the introduction, which I propose as a better understanding of the content of 
Conciliar Trinitarianism. This was as follows: there is One God, the Father, and 
that the Son and the Holy Spirit share in the divinity of the One God in a non-
subordinationist way such that the Trinity of Father, Son and Holy Spirit are all 
rightly called God and together work in the economy of salvation that culminates 
in the Incarnation6 and the outpouring of the Holy Spirit. This, being an outline, 
is obviously incomplete, but it will suffice to show that the flow of ideas is from 
claims about the Father, Son and Holy Spirit in themselves (theologhia) to claims 
about how the Father, Son and Holy Spirit act together in the economy of 
salvation (oikonomia). There is a distinction between the two kinds of discourse, 
but no suggestion that the latter reveals the former. It would be a lengthy task to 
document this approach exhaustively from the documents of Conciliar 
Trinitarianism, and there is not space to do so. I will take the Symbol of 
Constantinople (381), included among the documents approved at the Council of 
Chalcedon (451) as my primary example, and invite the reader to review the 
other documents of Conciliar Trinitarianism in the light of the suggestion I offer. 
I dedicate some space to the second article of the Symbol, regarding the Son and 
his Incarnation, since this is central preoccupation of the ecumenical councils, 
though for brevity I do not offer detailed documentation on individual claims. 
 
6 By “Incarnation” I do not mean the beginning of the human life of Jesus, but his whole human 
life, death, resurrection and ascension to the right hand of the Father as risen Lord, following the 
pattern of the Symbol of the Faith. 




 There is no need to remind the reader that the structure of this Symbol, 
although it does not enter into speculation about the inner life of the Trinity, is 
nevertheless “trinitarian” in the sense that it speaks of the roles in the economy 
of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. The trinitarian structuring of statements of faith 
was common in Fourth Century controversies, but was not in itself a marker of 
trinitarian orthodoxy, since it is found in the teachings both of those supportive 
of the final pro-Nicene position and of those against that emerging position.  
 The Symbol of Constantinople speaks first of the One God who is the Father 
Almighty, maker of heaven and earth, of all things visible and invisible. There is 
no expansion here of the role of the Father in the economy of salvation, but this 
role is implicit in what the Symbol later says about the generation of the Son and 
the “spiration” of the Spirit (the Symbol does not offer a verb to speak of the 
production of the Holy Spirit), and is then completed in what is said about the 
“missions” (again the Symbol does not reach the level of abstraction that would 
require a single word for what the Son and the Spirit do in the economy). The 
Father is the One God who is origin, both of the eternal being of the Son and the 
Spirit and of what they do in the economy of salvation. Such claims are implicit 
rather than explicit, and the short formulation of belief in the Father indicates a 
kind of apophatic reserve with regard to the Father’s role, such that the balance 
of this Symbol of language about the Father in relation to the Son and the Spirit 
approximates to that of the New Testament, where the Son’s role commands 
most attention, the Spirit’s role is second, and while God’s role is at the origin of 
everything, it is the one that attracts least direct comment. 
The Symbol then speaks of the Son, and the treatment of the Son may be 
divided into two discrete parts. The first part regards who the Son is in relation 
to the Father, and it reflects the outcome of the disputes of the Fourth Century, 
and as such is often regarded in recent trinitarian theology as evidence of a kind 
of breakthrough the result of which was the so-called formulation of the 
“doctrine of the Trinity” (understood as DT1). Thus, from a certain point of view, 
the novelty of this Fourth Century development lies in the clear exclusion of any 
the kinds of subordinationism that had been assumed in earlier Logos christology 
theological discourse. The key arguments leading to the exclusion of the such 
subordinationism were, it seems to me, the defence of the fact that the God is 
eternally Father, and therefore must eternally have a Son. Irrespective of 
hypotheses about the reasons for this breakthrough, the point that for my 
argument is crucial is that the importance of the second article of the Symbol is 
not confined to what it says about the eternal relation of the Son to the Father.  
 The second part of the second article of the Symbol of Constantinople, closely 
reflecting and expanding on that of Nicaea, however, also contains something of 
crucial interest to Conciliar Trinitarianism (understood as DT2, now, rather than 
as DT1). It is introduced by the important formulation “For us and for our 




salvation”. This represents the passage from the part related to the Son in relation 
to the Father to the part related to the Son’s work in the economy. It begins, 
obviously, from his incarnation through the work of the Holy Spirit, his 
crucifixion, suffering, death and burial, his resurrection and ascension to the right 
hand of the Father, his future coming and the claim that his Kingdom will be 
without end.7 Although this part of the Symbol is not generally given detailed 
consideration in trinitarian theology, since it seems to be traditional and 
uncontroversial material, it does come to represent the key question in the so-
called “Christological controversy” beginning in the 5th century. The debate 
between Nestorius and Cyril revolves around whether Christ is himself the 
second person of the Trinity such that it is the divine Son himself, the one 
identified as being consubstantial with the Father is, however, startlingly new 
compared with traditional formulations. In the light of the exclusion of the kind 
of subordinationism condemned at Nicaea, the claim is now that the Son who is 
himself consubstantial with the Father became a creature, and lived a fully 
human life.  For Nestorius, this was too much. If the Son is truly divine, he could 
not himself be said to be born of a human mother, suffer and die. Nestorius’ 
interpretation of the trinitarian teaching leads him to rule out the personal 
identity of the Son and Christ. For Cyril, instead, the belief of the church, however 
surprising, is that the Son who is consubstantial with the Father does himself 
truly become human. It is the interpretation of this second part of the second 
article of the creed that is in focus at the Council of Ephesus.8  
 There is no good reason to claim that this is not relevant to Conciliar 
Trinitarianism since the question touches on claims about one of the Trinity. To 
claim that the Nestorian controversy is “christological” rather than “trinitarian” 
only holds up if one assumes that the word “trinitarian” only applies to DT1, the 
doctrine of One God in three persons. But the ecumenical councils are not 
concerned with a doctrine of the Trinity in abstraction from the economy, such 
that the latter is revealed by the former. When we take the ecumenical councils 
together we do find something like the distinction between the “economic 
Trinity” and the “immanent Trinity” in the distinction between theologhia and 
oikonomia, but this does not function as it does in most recent theology. The issue 
underlying the whole controversy from Ephesus onwards is whether what is said 
about the human life of Jesus should be directly attributed to the human nature 
 
7 For an interesting comment on the relation between the Creeds and the gospels see (Wright 
2016). It seems important to state that the Symbol of the Faith was never intended as a substitute 
for the gospel. 
8 It is the interpretation of the second article of the Symbol of Nicaea that is in focus in the 
letters of Nestorius to Cyril, and of Cyril to Nestorius that were examined at Ephesus. 




of Jesus (the position embraced by Nestorius), the divine nature (a position 
excluded by both Nestorius and Cyril), or to the divine person of the Son (the 
position embraced by Cyril and the Council of Ephesus, 431). The Son in 
question, it should be clear, is the Eternal Son himself, the Second Person of the 
Trinity. Nestorius found it necessary to prise discourse about the eternal identity 
of the Son apart from discourse about the human life of Jesus. His denial of the 
title Theotokos, and the Cyrillian claim that it is the divine Son himself who suffers 
and dies, amounts to a separation of trinitarian discourse from discourse about 
Christ. The Council of Ephesus denies the validity of such a separation and 
approves claims about the personal identity of the Eternal Son and Jesus who is 
born of Mary and who dies on the cross. Nestorius fails to make the step from 
theologhia to oikonomia successfully, believing that the divinity of the Son rules out 
his direct personal involvement in the economy. Conciliar Trinitarianism, 
following Cyril, defends the involvement of the whole Trinity in the Christ event: 
Jesus is the eternal Son of the Father made incarnate by the power of the Holy 
Spirit.9 The councils continue to hold this line against a variety of attempts to 
attenuate the power and paradoxical character of the claim, against Nestorius, 
against Eutyches who denies the consubstantiality of the Eternal Son made flesh 
with human beings, against Nestorianizing interpretations of Chalcedon, and 
against the denial of a human activity and will in Jesus. In terms of a descending 
theology, Conciliar Trinitarianism culminates in Canon 10 of the Council of 553: 
“If anyone does not confess that he who was crucified in the flesh, our Lord Jesus 
Christ, is true God, Lord of glory and one of the Holy Trinity, anathema sit” (ND 
620/10). In terms of an ascending theology, Conciliar Trinitarianism culminates 
in the proclamation of the human will in Jesus as the human will of one of the 
 
9 The role of the Holy Spirit in the life of Jesus is not fully expressed in the documents of the 
ecumenical councils, but is not absent. There are multiple reference to the conception of Jesus by 
the power of the Spirit. In the 9th of Cyril’s Twelve Anathemas, read at the Council of Ephesus 
and officially recognized at the Council of 553, we read: “If anyone says that the one Lord Jesus 
Christ was glorified by the Spirit, implying that through him he had access to a power that was 
not his own, and that he received from the Spirit the power to overcome unclean spirits and to 
work divine signs among us, and does not rather say that he performed divine signs by virtue of 
the Spirit which was his own, anathema sit”. In canon 12 of the Council of 553, against positions 
of Theodore of Mopsuestia, it is maintained that Christ truly gives the Spirit. The reluctance to 
give extensive treatment to the Holy Spirit’s role in the life of Jesus is explained partly by the fact 
that it was not the direct object of debate, and partly by the concern that Christ’s relationship with 
the Spirit might misunderstood on an analogy with the prophets who received the Spirit. The 
point that they wished to defend was that the Spirit was his own, and not any denial that in his 
humanity he received and was guided by the Spirit. On the background to this question see 
(Keating, 1999). For a systematic treatment see (Coffey 2011). 






Therefore, preserving entirely what is neither fused not divided, we proclaim 
that the entire matter is this concise utterance: believing that one of the Holy 
Trinity, who after the incarnation is our Lord Jesus Christ, is our true God, we 
say that his two natures shine forth in his one hypostasis. In it, throughout his 
entire human existence in the flesh, he made manifest his miracles and his 
sufferings, not in mere appearance but in reality. (ND 637) 
 
It is precisely in this insistence that one of the Holy Trinity is fully human, “not 
in mere appearance but in reality” that we uncover the heart of Conciliar 
Trinitarianism. The doctrine of the Trinity culminates here: in the claim that one 
of the Trinity has become fully human by the work of the Holy Spirit, and lives a 
fully human life, returning as human being to the Father in the resurrection and 
ascension. The centrality of person rather than nature is confirmed at Nicaea II, 
when it extends the question to the veneration of images, where the veneration 
is directed at the person imaged (ND 1252). 
Returning briefly to the Symbol of Constantinople (381) before drawing this 
reflection to a close, we should note that the article on the Holy Spirit too 
manifests the same tendency to state theological and economic claims about the 
Holy Spirit together, with the effect that the theological claims find their 
completion in economic claims. Thus, while it is true that the Holy Spirit is 
understood to be divine and not one of the creatures, the language adopted 
emphasizes the role of the Holy Spirit in the economy of salvation. Thus, the 
Symbol says that he proceeds from the Father, and this should be taken as a 
theological claim, but also that he is Lord and giver of life, and this is said 
primarily not in relation to the Father and the Son, but in relation to creatures. 
Similarly, he is “worshipped and glorified” by creatures, and has spoken (to 
creatures, not to the Father and the Son), through the prophets. The Symbol had 
already spoken of the role of the Holy Spirit in the Incarnation of the Son. The 
fruit of the operation of the Holy Spirit is the one Holy Catholic and apostolic 
Church, baptism, the forgiveness of sins, the resurrection of the dead and the life 
of the world to come.  
Here too, as with the article on the Son, it is the implicit canons of modern 
trinitarian thought that tend towards a separation of claims about the divinity of 
the Holy Spirit in himself from claims about the Holy Spirit’s roles in the 
economy of salvation. In the Symbol the two are distinguishable, but 
immediately coordinated. The emphasis in Conciliar Trinitarianism remains on 
the economic work of the Spirit, as it had been the case with that of the Son. In 
the logic of Conciliar Trinitarianism, it is necessary to defend the true divinity of 
the Holy Spirit, as it was necessary to defend the true divinity of the Son, because 
only if the second and third divine persons are recognized as truly God can they 








I have argued that DT1 is not an adequate statement of Conciliar Trinitarianism. 
This does not mean that it is not true. Nor does the claim that DT2 is a better 
statement of Conciliar Trinitarianism mean that one should not develop 
speculative accounts of the inner life of the Trinity, theories of persons, relations, 
perichoresis and so on. I see no reason why the shape of Conciliar Trinitarianism 
need be the only, or final, form of trinitarianism. The fact that patristic and 
scholastic theologians have developed reflections developing precisely such 
theories without finding themselves in contradiction of the ecumenical councils 
shows that not only are such developments possible, but have in fact emerged 
and have asserted their importance for trinitarian theology. Indeed, many of 
them have made their way into magisterial teaching, as the collection of teachings 
presented by the editors of Neuner-Dupuis makes clear.  
Nevertheless, it is not helpful to impose such developments on our 
reconstruction of Conciliar Trinitarianism.10 The obvious question arises: what is 
the precise relation of Conciliar Trinitarianism to DT1, namely theological 
discourse on the Trinity apart from the economy of salvation, but I will not 
develop this point here. Instead, in closing, I would like to briefly set out one way 
of expressing the contrast between DT1 in its contemporary form, and Conciliar 
Trinitarianism understood as expressing DT2. It hinges on a certain 
interpretation of the role of revelation, which – as we have seen in our comments 
on Neuner-Dupuis’ summary of the Second Vatican Council and Dominum et 
Vivificantem – approaches the question of the relation of the economy of salvation 
to the doctrine of the Trinity (DT1) by means of the idea that the former reveals 
the latter. In contrast, DT2 suggests that the economy of salvation is something 
more than what is implied in the discourse on the Trinity in se, such that what is 
revealed is not just what the Trinity is in itself, but also what the Trinity has 
brought about “for us and for our salvation”. 
Contemporary theology has struggled with the question of the relevance of 
the doctrine of the Trinity, but has tended not to recognize that the issue is most 
simply resolved by shifting our attention from DT1 to DT2. To speak of the 
relevance of the doctrine of the Trinity does not necessarily mean the relevance 
of the doctrine that there is One God in three persons. Again, this does not mean 
 
10 Brian Daley has worked consistently on the relations between the doctrines of the Trinity 
and the doctrine of Christ in the patristic period. See, for example, (Daley 2007). 




that DT1 is irrelevant. It simply means that the relevance of DT1 is established 
when properly coordinated with DT2: our discourse about the Trinity in se 
becomes relevant when it aliments discourse about the Trinity pro nobis. To argue 
with Nestorius that the Son is consubstantial with the Father, a “trinitarian” claim 
as far as the standard view is concerned, is insufficient. From the point of view of 
DT1, Nestorius is probably orthodox, but not from the point of view of DT2. 
Neither is the Chalcedonian teaching that Christ is consubstantial with the Father 
as to the divinity, and consubstantial with us as to his humanity sufficient, if that 
claim is understood in a Nestorianizing way. It is essential that we make it clear 
that the Christ is the divine Son, one of the Trinity, and accept all of the paradoxes 
that flow from his Incarnation: the Creator has become creature, the invisible has 
become visible, the immutable has become mutable, the impassible has become 
passible and so on. 
This implies an inversion in the direction of the logic of theological 
argumentation about the “economic” and the “immanent” Trinity. The standard 
view is that the “economic Trinity” reveals the Trinity, yielding DT1. Thus, we 
might say that the life of Jesus culminating in the event of the cross, reveals the 
eternal relationship of the Son to the Father. This remains true. But the standard 
view, however, can also suggest that the economy also reveals something about 
divinity itself and the attributes of divinity, on the assumption that that economic 
Trinity is a point of departure that serves to reveal the Trinity in itself.  
Thus, the tendency is to think that the event of the cross if taken seriously 
should lead us to attenuate or even reject claims about divine impassibility. In 
practice, if we take revelation as our prime category, we may feel obliged to say 
that the suffering of Jesus on the cross reveals that there is something 
corresponding to suffering in the Trinity. This might be true, since we can say 
that what is suffering in the economy corresponds to divine intratrinitarian love 
in the “immanent Trinity.” It only complicates matters, however, if we attempt 
to claim on this basis that suffering as love, or if we abandon the idea of divine 
impassibility. The teaching of the councils is simpler: it does not require us to 
change the meaning of suffering such that suffering is revealed to be love, that 
the suffering of Christ reveals that in the Trinity there is something like, but also 
unlike, suffering. Rather, the teaching is that the Son who is divine and therefore 
impassible in himself has become passible for us. What the Son becomes does not 
reveal what he is in himself, but what he has become economically. Thus with all 
of the other attributes: the visibility of Christ does not reveal a kind of visibility 
of the Eternal Son, the growth in wisdom and age of Christ does not reveal a kind 
of growth in wisdom and age of the Eternal Son and so on. The non-confusion of 
natures taught by Chalcedon means that just as divinity and humanity are not 
mixed or confused, so too the impassibility of the divine nature is not confused 
with the passibility of the human nature, invisibility with visibility, 




immmutability with mutability and so on. What holds the two sets of contraries 
together is the hypostatic union, the person of the Son, who is both divine and 
human. Discourse on Christ is discourse on what the Son has become in the 
economy of salvation, for us and for our salvation, and not the revelation of 
hitherto unsuspected creaturely attributes of the divinity. Similarly, discourse on 
the Holy Spirit speaking through the prophets is not understood as a revelation 
of the eternal function of the Holy Spirit within the Trinity.  
Conciliar Trinitarianism (understood as DT2) relates what happens in the 
economy to what is true in the Trinity prescinding from the economy, according 
to a scheme where the humanity of Jesus does not reveal the divinity of the Son, 
but the Son himself; not the nature, but the person.11 It is his humanity, rather 
than directly his divinity that is of interest: what Jesus reveals is human nature 
in the mode of sonship, rather than his own divine nature. Divine sonship, not 
divine nature. In Jesus, human suffering is transformed into love. The discourse 
of Conciliar Trinitarianism certainly defends the divinity of the Son, but places 
the person of the Son and his true humanity at the centre of the action. The event 
of the cross is a trinitarian act: one of the Trinity (the Son) is sent by the Father in 
the power of the Spirit, and lives a human life in the power of the Spirit, in 
obedience to the Father, suffers and dies. The Father then raises him in the power 
of the Spirit to eternal life. This economy is not the revelation of what is eternally 
true of God in Godself, but the salvific act of the Trinity acting economically in a 
new way. Conciliar Trinitarianism is concerned with this doctrine of the Trinity 
(DT2), rather than any direct account of the relations of the Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit apart from the economy of salvation (DT1). The ecumenical councils do 
contain elements that are essential to DT1, but the trinitarianism of the 
ecumenical councils themselves is such that statements about the Trinity in itself 
ground an economic trinitarianism.12 
 
11 This is not obvious to all scholars. A recent work that systematically fails to distinguish 
between the function of person and nature is (Crisp 2016). A recently published which makes 
important use of the distinction is the similarly entitled (McFarland 2019). 
12 David Coffey is strong on this point: his reworking of the terms of Rahner's Grundaxiom, 
which speaks of a biblical Trinity, an immanent Trinity and an economic Trinity points 
substantially in the same direction as this article. See especially (Coffey 1999). For Coffey, the 
standard appropriation of Rahner’s Grundaxiom leads to the idea that one moves from the 
economic Trinity to the immanent Trinity. Instead, he believes that the biblical data lead to 
reflection on the Trinity in itself (the “immanent Trinity”), but that the acquisitions on the level 
of the who the Son and the Spirit are eternally leads to a new and richer understanding of the 
biblical data. It is one thing to say that a man died on the cross, but another to say that one of the 
Trinity became human and died on the cross. This second statement, for Coffey, would be 
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economic trinitarianism. He writes: “The economic Trinity [...] is the integration of the immanent 
Trinity with the biblical data, and this entails a return […] Thus the Son in the economic Trinity 
is the eternal Logos become man, or human, in the Jesus of Nazareth of the gospels, a figure not 
identical, in description at least, with the Son of either the biblical or the immanent Trinity. And 
something similar can be said of the Holy Spirit and the Father as well” (Coffey 1999, 16). For a 
general introduction to David Coffey’s theology of the Trinity and the articulation of the same 
with his Spirit Christology see (O'Byrne 2010). 
